57
safe even if they took advantage of “regulatory
arbitrage”.9
For such banks, any
conce ssions on banking secrecy would compromise their business models. Instead,
they saw the UBS sc andal as an op portunity to poach clients from a struggling
rival.
After 2009, howe ver, it was becoming increasingly clear that the cri sis was not
restricted to UBS alone. The vulnerabili t y even of traditional pr ivate banks with
no representation outside Switzerland was forcefully demonstrated by a criminal
indictment of Wegelin & Co. in Fe b ruary 2012 that resulted in the bank’s collapse
within a few weeks. Representatives of the Swiss financial services industry now
demanded decisive and resolute political a ction to resolve the crisis, inc luding the
acceptance of AEI on tax matters. However, their voices went unheard be cause the
mode of political inte rac tion had by that time shifted from informal deliberations
between governm ent officials and representatives of the financial services industry
to formal disputes between political parties (Culpe pper 2011). Put simply, by the
time the indus try had finally established a common position (about four years after
the beginning of the conflict), it had lost c ontrol of the issue ; political partie s were
now set ting the agenda and they would not help the financial services industry by
compromising on banking se crecy regulations because voters seemed against the
idea. The interna tiona l conflict over Swiss banking se crecy had turned into p oliti-
cal v ote-see king rat her than solution -orie nted policy-making.
In Liechtenstein, by contrast, the political reac tion to international pressure was
coordinated between the government, the Prince ly House and representatives of
9
In addition to a s eries of news paper articles (e.g. see the quotations from Patrick Odier, Presi-
dent of the Swiss Bankin g Association, in NZZ, “Der Bankenverband übt Selbstkritik”, Septem-
ber 4, 2013 ), this view was also expressed in the criminal proceedings against Wegeli n & Co.
(see Bruderer 2012). 2012).