Robert Schütze
falsch auf die «Verfassungsánderungskompetenz» zu setzen.®® Das
Rechtsmittel, das logisch aus der Gliedstaatensouveràánitàt folgte, war
das unilaterale Recht auf Nullifikation:
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Jeder, der auch nur ein wenig unsere Verfassung kennt, muss zuge-
geben, dass alle souveránen Hoheitsrechte vom Volk delegiert und
zwischen Bundes- und Staatenebene aufgeteilt sind und dass beide
somit ihren Teil aufgrund des gleichen Besitztitels haben. Es
scheint daher unmöglich, den Staaten ihr Recht auf Feststellung
und Abhilfe eines Verfassungsbruchs zu nehmen. Das Recht, sol-
che Fälle zu entscheiden, ist ein Wesensmerkmal der Souveränität.
Es kann den Staaten nicht genommen werden, ohne dass sie ihre
ganze Souveränität verlieren würden und sich so in untergeordnete
Gebietskörperschaften verwandeln. Es ist doch seltsam, einerseits
Kompetenzen teilen zu wollen und anderseits das ausschliessliche
Recht, die Grösse der Teile zu bestimmen, nur einer Partei zuzu-
schreiben. In Wirklichkeit ist das überhaupt keine Teilung, denn
rotecting the General Government against the encroachments of the governments of
the States, but also of the encroachments of the former on the latter — and as being,
in fact, the only means provided by the Constitution of confining all the powers of
the system to their proper constitutional spheres; and, consequently, of determining
the limits assigned to each. Such a construction of its powers would, in fact, raise
one of the departments of the General Government above the parties who created
the constitutional compact, and virtually invest it with the authority to alter, at its
pleasure, the relative powers of the General and State Governments, on the distri-
bution of which, as established by the Constitution, our whole system rests — and
which, by an express provision of the instrument, can only be altered by three-
fourths of the States, as has already been shown.» (Ibid., 345.)
«The disease is, that a majority of the States, through the General Government, by
construction, usurp powers not delegated, and by their exercise, increase their we-
alth and authority at the expense of the minority. How absurd, then, to expect the
injured States to attempt a remedy by proposing an amendment to be ratified by
three-fourths of the States, when, by supposition, there is a majority opposed to
them? Nor would it be less absurd to expect the General Government to propose
amendments, unless compelled to that course by the acts of a State. The Govern-
ment can have no inducement. It has a more summary mode — the assumption of
power by construction. The consequence is clear — neither would resort to the
amending power — the one, because it would be useless — and the other, because it
could effect its purpose without it — and thus the highest power known to the Con-
stitution — on the salutary influence of which, on the operations of our political in-
stitutions, so much was calculated, would become, in practice, obsolete, as stated;
and in lieu of it, the will of the majority, under the agency of construction, would
be substituted, with unlimited and supreme power.» (Ibid., 356.)
