Liechtenstein Politische Schriften
there is a tendency for the «exploitation» of the great or large by the small in groups with common interests, because the small often have clear incentives to free-ride, when the probability is high that a certain «public» good or service is provided by the larger ones.15The propo si - tion of Olson holds true for countries, for groups and for individuals. In the latter case, an operationalization of size seems difficult, although there are some workable economic proxies for the «size» of an individu- al, such as wealth, influence or weights in a political body in the context of 
voting. Size in relative terms An alternative way of defining size, and therefore smallness, is available for the individual level, since Olson’s notion does not appear very sui t - able in the individual context. Again, it is possible to analogously ap ply this definition, which we will refer to as size in relative terms, on the group or country level. According to Xu (1999) size is defined with the aid of the benefit one gains from something. The smaller individual, ac- cordingly, benefits less from something, say, the consumption of a good or service, than the larger. Formalizing this definition, we get αiS > αjS, whenever αi> αj(1) where S is the benefit and αiS is the share of the benefit of individual i. Xu denotes i as the larger individual and j as the smaller, strictly accor- ding to their share of the benefit or utility. Note that, contrary to the de- finition of size in international economics, the small is always non-neg- ligible here. A proper example of the definition of size in relative terms applied to countries might be the provision of a global public good. Size, then, can be measured according to the benefits of different countries de- rived from the public good. Vanuatu, e.g., is generally assumed to bene- fit much more from international cooperation against global warming (a global public good) than Austria; hence, Vanuatu would be larger than Austria in this 
Size and smallness in model contexts 15Tietzel and Müller (1998), building on Olson and Zeckhauser (1966) as well as on Rapoport et al. (1976), show the game theoretical rationale of Olson’s findings.


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