

Royal College of Defence Studies

DISSERTATION - SUBMISSION DATE 19 JULY 2017

Submission Cover Sheet

MEMBER Name:	Tyson Sara
KING'S STUDENT Number:	1682671
Dissertation Title:	How do states without defence forces defend themselves? An examination of security and sovereignty in small states.
Dissertation Supervisor:	Dr David Roberts
Word Count:	14463

I confirm that this Essay is all my own work, is properly referenced and in accordance with the Essay Writing Guide and MA Handbook Guidance. I am aware of King's policy on Plagiarism, Collusion, Cheating and Fraud.

Signature: Original Signed

Date: 17 July 2017

ABSTRACT

This paper will examine how the small states of the world that have chosen not to develop armed forces defend their sovereignty and national interests. It will use a small number of case studies incorporating historical background with contemporary issues and the non-military methods that are used to protect these states and advance their interests. The paper highlights the importance of the existing global order, which recognises sovereign states as equals, together with the relationship between sovereign equality, alliances and demilitarisation.

CONTENTS

1. Introduction, definitions and scope.

2. Defence without force. The factors that influence the development of military forces.

3. Defence by Rules. Protections offered to states by the international system.

- Liechtenstein
- Tuvalu

4. Defence by Patrons and Partners. Protections offered by to states by alliances.

- Iceland and NATO
- Micronesian Compacts of Free Association

5. Defence from self harm.

- Costa Rica

6. Outlook and Conclusion.

Chapter 1 – Introduction, definitions and scope

The Defence and security of a state is a sacred responsibility of its Government. The maintenance of credible defences is as fundamental a function of the state as the provision of healthcare, education or social services. Indeed the armed forces of a state are often a visible symbol of a state's sovereignty. Heads of state are regularly styled as the Commander-in-Chief of their armed forces as is the case in the United States. Foreign leaders are welcomed with military guards of honour and gun salutes having themselves arrived on a military aircraft accompanied by uniformed aides de camp. How then, in a world where military power and symbolism is entrenched in statecraft and concepts of sovereignty, can a state not have armed forces? How can a state defend its sovereignty without armed men and women and complex and expensive weapon systems poised along its frontiers? How can sovereignty be established and maintained without the means to physically use force to defend it?

In short, how do states without defence forces defend themselves? This is the question this paper will examine. In examining this question this paper will take a relatively purist approach in defining a state and a defence force.

In defining a state this paper will only be looking at states that are sovereign and members of the United Nations (UN). This removes semi-sovereign entities such as British overseas territories like Bermuda or the Cayman Islands. It also excludes states with many elements of sovereignty or whose sovereignty is disputed and have not joined the United Nations like the Cook Islands or the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

Defining a defence force is slightly more difficult but for the purposes of this paper if a state calls its armed forces a military, whether that military is a credible and capable of defending national sovereignty or not, then it will be excluded from the scope of this paper. This includes states with token forces like San Marino¹, Antigua and Barbuda² and Tonga³. It does not exclude those states that have a provision for armed forces in their constitutions or those states that possess highly capable police or coastguard capabilities if the state declares that they are only for law enforcement or internal security.

This leaves a small but not insignificant list of states from around the world that do not possess an armed instrument of national power with which to defend themselves. These states are:

¹ San Marino Military, <http://www.sanmarino.sm/on-line/en/home/institutions/military-and-police-corps.html>

² Antigua and Barbuda Defence Force, <http://abdf.gov.ag>

³ His Majesty's Armed Forces of Tonga, <http://www.mic.gov.to/ministrydepartment/338-defence>

1. Andorra
2. Costa Rica
3. Dominica
4. Grenada
5. Haiti
6. Iceland
7. Kiribati
8. Liechtenstein
9. Marshall Islands
10. Mauritius
11. Federated States of Micronesia
12. Nauru
13. Palau
14. Panama
15. St. Lucia
16. St. Vincent and the Grenadines
17. Samoa
18. Solomon Islands
19. Tuvalu
20. Vanuatu

These countries account for over 10% of the membership of the United Nations⁴. Together their GDP, at US\$159.74 billion is greater than Kuwait, Kazakhstan or Hungary⁵. Their collective population of nearly 23 million is larger than the Netherlands, Chile or Romania⁶. Their collective land area of 306,210 square kilometres is larger than Italy, the Philippines or Great Britain⁷. Most astonishingly, the 20 countries without militaries have a maritime Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of over 15 million square kilometres, which is larger than the EEZ of any single country and larger than the EEZs of Indonesia, Canada and Brazil combined⁸. To put it together means these states combined have the 57th largest economy, the 54th largest population, the 71st largest land area and the largest EEZ, with not a single soldier, sailor or

⁴ <http://www.un.org/en/member-states/> - retrieved 30 June 2017.

⁵ International Monetary Fund, **World Economic Outlook Database**, April 2017, retrieved from <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2017/01/weodata/weorept.aspx> .

⁶ World Development Indicators Database, World Bank, 17 April 2017. Retrieved from <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/POP.pdf> , 30 June.

⁷ Central Intelligence Agency, **CIA World Fact Book 2017**, (New York: Skyhorse, 2016).

⁸ <http://www.seaaroundus.org/data/#/eez> , Retrieved 1 July 2017.

airman to defend it. By sovereign representation, economy, population, land area or EEZ size the amount of the world that is undefended by military forces is significant and there are certainly interests and territory that requires defending.

This paper will argue that despite the absence of military forces, it does not mean that these countries are undefended. The paper will examine the ways in which small states use non-military means to defend their sovereignty and interests in the modern world. These non-military means of Defence are varied and combine the natural environment of a state with a range of economic, political and diplomatic measures. The paper will look at the relationship between geography, history and strategic circumstances and how it influences a state's decision not to develop military forces. It will go on to examine the international system and the degree to which it protects sovereign states and the potential for this system to be strengthened or weakened into the future. The paper will also look at the role of alliances and their effect on both Defence and sovereignty. Finally the paper will look at the risk posed by militaries to the very societies they are charged to protect and the effect of demilitarisation. The paper will conclude with an appreciation of what changes to the international system may mean for smaller states and their ability to defend themselves without recourse to force. In the interests of brevity the paper will examine these issues in detail through the lens of seven states that best embody the issues at play with the international system (Liechtenstein and Tuvalu), alliances (Iceland and the Pacific Compact States of Palau, Micronesia and Marshall Islands) and demilitarisation (Costa Rica).

Chapter 2 - Defence without force - The factors that influence the development of military forces.

Geography, demography, history and strategic circumstances influence the world outlook of every state. The 20 states covered by this paper are no different and each of them have a number of geographic, historical and strategic factors involved in their decision not to possess armed forces. What makes these decisions interesting is that there are many states that seem similar in geographic, demographic, historical or strategic situation that have made the opposite choice and developed armed forces of their own. This chapter will examine these factors and look at examples of where states in similar situations have made different choices about the need for armed forces and why that has occurred.

No Single Common Factor

In looking at these factors it is important to examine that while there may be some unifying threads between the 20 states without armed forces in terms of geography, demography, history and strategic circumstance, there is no one magic formula. Each state has made decisions due to very different experiences, in different parts of the world.

The diversity starts with geography. It is reasonable to say that all of the 20 states without armed forces are geographically small. Defending a small area is difficult. They lack any sort of depth from which to manoeuvre or resupply, it concentrates targets for an enemy to strike and there is little room for military infrastructure like airbases or training ranges. While there is a wide difference between the smallest of the 20, Nauru at 21 sqkm⁹, and the largest, Iceland at 100,250 sqkm, Iceland is still only ranked 108th in the world for land area¹⁰. That being said there are states smaller than Iceland that have powerful militaries to defend their territories such as Denmark, the Netherlands, Singapore or Israel¹¹. Indeed the two smallest sovereign states in the world, Monaco and the Vatican City, both have their own military forces, the Caribiniers du Prince¹² and the Pontifical Swiss Guard¹³. Size on its own is influential in not having a military but not an absolute determinant.

Likewise the nature of the terrain can be influential but is no certain guide as to whether a country will have armed forces or not. It is true that 15 of the 20 states without armed forces are

⁹ Central Intelligence Agency, 601.

¹⁰ Ibid, 394.

¹¹ International Institute of Strategic Studies, **The Military Balance 2016**, (London: Routledge, 2016), 89-90, 122-124, 286-288, 333-336.

¹² <http://en.gouv.mc/Government-Institutions/The-Government/Ministry-of-Interior/The-Palace-Guards>.

¹³ <http://www.swissguard.va/content/guardiasvizzera/it.html>.

island states with no land borders, but that only represents 40% of the 37 sovereign states that have no land borders¹⁴. The inconsistency goes further with countries that are small island states and neighbouring each other choosing different paths, such as Antigua and Barbuda which has a small military¹⁵ and sits next to Dominica that does not¹⁶, or Tonga that maintains multiple military units¹⁷ and sits alongside Samoa that only has a largely unarmed police force¹⁸.

The second area of diversity between these states is that of population. While 16 of the 20 states have less than one million people a small population does not in and of itself rule out having a military. Using the examples above of Dominica and Antigua and Barbuda, both have similar populations of around 80,000 but one has a military and one does not. The example of Tonga and Samoa is more striking where at 200,000 Samoa has nearly twice the population of Tonga but remains unarmed. There is considerable difference between the smallest being again Nauru at 10,000¹⁹ and the largest being Haiti at 10.8 million people²⁰. Once again there are states smaller in population than Haiti that have significant military forces including Sweden, Singapore, Israel, and Jordan²¹. Along with having the smallest land area, the Vatican City has the smallest population in the world but does maintain the military Swiss Guard. As with physical area the issue of population seems influential but not absolute.

Military forces are expensive and wealth can be a factor in deciding whether a military is in the national interest. Like the other factors though there is significant diversity in the 20 countries without armed forces. There is a mixture of high, medium and low income countries in the group of 20 with 15% being high income, 55% being upper middle income, 25% being lower middle income and 5% being low income. This has 25% of the unarmed states above the world average for income²². In Human Development terms 15% have Very High Human Development, 45% have High, 30% have Medium and 10% have Low. This means 55% of the states are above the world average for Human Development²³. Just as with land area and

¹⁴ Central Intelligence Agency, 941.

¹⁵ Ibid, 33.

¹⁶ Ibid, 248.

¹⁷ Ibid, 856.

¹⁸ Ibid, 731.

¹⁹ Ibid, 601.

²⁰ Ibid, 374.

²¹ International Institute for Strategic Studies, 143-145, 286-290, 333-336, 336-338.

²² http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD?order=wbapi_data_value_2014+wbapi_data_value+wbapi_data_value-last&sort=desc, retrieved 2 July 2017.

²³ http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr_2016_statistical_annex.pdf. Entries for Tuvalu, Nauru and the Marshall Islands are estimates drawn from David Hastings, **Filling Gaps in the Human Development Index: Findings for Asia and the Pacific**, (Bangkok: UNESCAP

population, there are a number of countries of similar size and economic weight where some have militaries and some do not. Liechtenstein is a small landlocked high performing European economy as is San Marino yet Liechtenstein is unarmed and San Marino maintains the Guards of the Rock and a citizen militia. Costa Rica and Panama are Upper Middle Income Central American States with no military sitting in the same region as Nicaragua, Guatemala and Honduras who are all Lower Middle Income Countries with significant military capabilities. There is no single set of economic circumstances that determine whether a state will build a military or not.

A common historical picture for these 20 states is even more difficult to find than the broad similarities around area and population. Of the 20 states, 11 are former British colonial possessions, three are former US colonial possessions, one is a former Danish possession and three are products of the Latin American independence movements of the early 19th Century²⁴. Of the 20 only Liechtenstein and Andorra have been independent for more than 200 years and even then, their sovereignty was in a framework of European Imperial allegiances. Of the 20 states there are only three that have suffered invasion and occupation by a foreign power in the last 50 years. These three states Grenada, Haiti and Panama were all invaded by the United States, they all had military forces when they were invaded and, crucially, those military forces and the Governments they supported are recognized as being causal factors for the invasion by being instrumental in holding undemocratic leaders in power²⁵.

The Utility of Armed Forces

The type of state choosing to have no military is therefore highly variable in terms of size, population, history and circumstance. What has greater commonality is the utility of military forces in mitigating security threats to these states. It can be argued that military forces defend a state in three main ways.

The first way is to be a credible fighting force that has the ability to defeat armed attacks from likely adversaries. This is the approach taken by larger nations like India, China and Russia. These militaries are capable of fighting alone, tend to be large in number and possess a wide

Report, February 2007), retrieved from https://web.archive.org/web/20111005100501/http://www.unescap.org/pdd/publications/working_paper/wp_09_02.pdf

²⁴ Dominica, Grenada, Kiribati, Mauritius, Nauru, St Lucia, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu and Vanuatu are all former British possessions. Micronesia, Marshall Islands and Palau are former US possessions. Iceland is a former Danish possession. Haiti gained independence from France and Costa Rica and Panama from Spain in the early 19th Century.

²⁵ William R. Keylor, **A World of Nations**, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 281-283.

array of complex capabilities²⁶. This is also the approach to external defence taken by Latin American countries where few alliances exist and forces are developed to deal with an attack by immediate neighbours as is the case in Chile, Argentina and Brazil.

The second way is to be a deterrent force that may be capable of being defeated by likely adversaries but at such a considerable cost so as to not be worthwhile. This is an approach taken by smaller non-aligned countries like Finland and Switzerland where large conscript based militia forces can mobilise in the event of crisis and inflict significant losses and casualties on an aggressor. Finland used this strategy to avoid annexation by the Soviet Union in the Winter and Continuation Wars of the 1940s²⁷. Switzerland mobilized its forces during the Second World War and despite Hitler having a plan for the conquest of Switzerland called Operation Tannenbaum it was never implemented, in part because the scale of 11 German Divisions it would take would be too large an undertaking given Germany's other commitments at the time²⁸.

The third way is to be a contributing force that provides capabilities as part of a collective security arrangement. This is the approach taken by NATO countries and those in alliance relationships with the United States like South Korea, Japan and Australia. This is also the case for smaller regional security arrangements such as the Regional Security System in the Caribbean where small states pool small military resources to create a force capable of meeting the low-level threats that the region presents²⁹.

Naturally there are also combinations of the above with the US, UK and France being capable of fighting alone but they are also a part of NATO and possess nuclear deterrent capabilities. Estonia and Norway maintain a strategy of militia-based conventional deterrence within the framework of the NATO alliance.

Each state will make assessments around the nature of the threat posed to it and the tools that are available to defend against that threat. The relationship between military activity and

²⁶ Mary Kaldor and Joseph E. Stiglitz, **Protection Without Protectionism and the Challenge of Global Governance**, in Joseph E. Stiglitz and Mary Kaldor (eds.), *The Quest for Security: Protection Without Protectionism and the Challenge of Global Governance*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), 3-4.

²⁷ Colin S. Gray, **War, Peace and International Relations**, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007), 147-148.

²⁸ Vagts, Detlev F. "**Switzerland, International Law and World War II.**" *The American Journal of International Law* 91, no. 3 (1997), 467-469.

²⁹ <http://www.rss.org.bb/about-us.html>

geography means that states with small land areas tend to be difficult to defend militarily³⁰. To defend a small area a state requires extensive military capabilities that are able to project outside the territory of the state to create the depth required. Such capabilities require large numbers of troops and large military budget. To justify the social and financial cost of conscription and complex capabilities the perceived threat must be clear and immediate and the state must possess the resources to produce the required forces. Israel is a state with a small land area and small population but it maintains significant military capabilities and employs large-scale conscription in order to defend itself. Israel has what they consider to be a clear threat that requires mitigation and they are wealthy enough to afford the military capabilities required³¹.

From all of this analysis, the issues of size, population, wealth and proximity to a military threat stand out as being the four practical factors that influence a state's decision to have a military. A fifth factor of national prestige can override the practical factors but this rarely results in a capable military but rather a token or ceremonial force. A state requires sufficient territory to defend, sufficient manpower to recruit, sufficient wealth to pay troops and buy equipment and a sufficient enough threat nearby to warrant the expense. Where any of the above four factors is insufficient then building a military becomes harder to achieve or justify. This does not mean that states have nothing to defend but just that having a military is not the tool to provide that defence. Where a military is impossible or impractical, small states must find other non-military means to defend their sovereignty and interests.

³⁰ Rupert Smith, **The Utility of Force**, (London: Allen Lane, 2005), 153-155

³¹ Ibid, 18-20.

Chapter 3 - Defence by Rules. Protections offered to states by the international system.

The post war international system dominated by the United Nations offers significant protections to the nation state. The United Nations Charter made war illegal except in self-defence and required that any military action against another state needed the approval of the United Nations Security Council³². Those states that gained membership of the United Nations fell under a system that recognized their sovereignty equally with all other states and that offered protection from invasion and coercion³³. For smaller states this was a guarantee of sovereignty that they had never had before. States no longer had to fight to protect their sovereignty, nor did they need to surrender elements of sovereignty to a larger power in order to be protected.

Liechtenstein

One such state is the Principality of Liechtenstein, a 160 square kilometre wedge of land alongside the headwaters of the Rhine River between Switzerland and Austria. It has a population of around 37,000 people of whom approximately 70% are Liechtenstein citizens³⁴. Liechtenstein is a political construction of the age of European Empires. The Princes of Liechtenstein were a noble family in the service of the Austrian Habsburgs. They took their name from a white chalky limestone (lichter stein) castle they bought near Vienna in the 12th century³⁵. The family built a reputation for devoted imperial diplomatic, political and military service and through shrewd politics and wise investment they developed a powerful portfolio of position and property. Most of the family's extensive estates were in what is now the Czech Republic and Slovakia but were then Bohemia and Moravia³⁶. These estates were vast, grand and produced significant income but they lacked the appropriate political status in that they were beholden to another suzerain who himself was beholden to the Holy Roman Emperor. In order to gain a seat in the Imperial Diet the Liechtensteins needed to possess lands that were beholden to the Emperor alone without any sort of intermediary Lord. Two such entities were found in the form of the Lordships of Vaduz and Schellenberg. In 1699 Prince Johann Adam von Liechtenstein purchased the Lordship of Schellenberg and the first option to buy the Lordship of Vaduz from the cash strapped Count of Hohenems. In 1712 with the fortunes of the Count of Hohenems continuing to decline the County of Vaduz was sold to the Liechtensteins. Now in possession of two entities that had direct fealty to the Emperor the Liechtensteins petitioned the Emperor to join them into a single Principality (or Fürstentum) which gave the

³² <http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-vii/index.html>, Article 51.

³³ <http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-i/index.html>, Article 2.

³⁴ Central Intelligence Agency, 506-508.

³⁵ David Beattie, **Liechtenstein: A Modern History**, (London: I B Taurus, 2004), 8.

³⁶ Peter H. Wilson, **Europe's Tragedy, A History of the Thirty Years War**, (London: Allen Lane, 2009), 354.

family sovereign status within the Empire and a voting seat in the Imperial Diet³⁷.

The joining of Vaduz and Schellenberg by Emperor Charles VI in 1719 is celebrated in Liechtenstein as the foundation of the state. In legal terms there were three subsequent events that led to this tiny nation's current sovereign status. The first was prompted by Napoleon. When he defeated the Austrians at Ulm and Austerlitz in 1805 it led to the Treaty of Pressburg. This Treaty forced the Austrian Emperor to recognize the status of Bavaria and Württemberg as Kingdoms and led to the demise of the Holy Roman Empire. Emperor Francis dissolved the Holy Roman Empire in 1806 and declared himself Emperor of Austria. Meanwhile the Confederation of the Rhine was created by Napoleon to bring together the many small German States and excluding Prussia and Austria. Partly due to personal links to Napoleon the Liechtenstein family and their tiny Principality of Liechtenstein were admitted into the Confederation. This, despite the fact that no member of the Liechtenstein family had yet set foot within the borders of the Principality even though they had owned and drawn legitimacy from it for almost 100 years. When Napoleon fell the Confederation of the Rhine turned into the German Confederation and its membership, including Liechtenstein, was confirmed by the Congress of Vienna. This confederation still had the Habsburg Emperor as its head but the states were notionally sovereign within its bounds³⁸.

The rivalry between Prussia and Austria mounted over the next half a century and culminated in the Austro-Prussian War of 1866. This war was a critical time for the evolution of Liechtenstein and its view on military defence. The Liechtensteiners mobilized their full military strength for this war, 80 men. They were sent to hold a key mountain pass on the Austro-Italian frontier, a task they completed without firing a shot or sighting the enemy. At the war's end and with Austria defeated the Liechtenstein Army marched home 81 strong having collected an Italian into their ranks. Austria's defeat led to the demise of the German Confederation and for the first time in its history Liechtenstein was independent and beholden to no higher Lord or Congress. It also meant that the requirement of the Confederation for all members to provide a military contingent commensurate to their size was no longer valid. The Liechtenstein Parliament, the Landtag, in view of being free of this requirement voted to disband the Army on the grounds of cost. The Prince objected on the grounds of the state being defenceless but in the absence of a clear threat and with close relations to a still powerful Austria, the Prince eventually agreed. The Liechtenstein Army was disbanded on 12 February 1868³⁹.

³⁷ Beattie, 14-16.

³⁸ Ibid, 20-22.

³⁹ Ibid, 24-30.

Conscious of its size, and with the Liechtenstein family still residing in Vienna and their Bohemian estates, Liechtenstein quickly established a Customs and Monetary union with the Austro-Hungarian Empire. This Union lasted until Austria-Hungary's defeat in the First World War, in which Liechtenstein remained neutral. This neutrality in the First World War is critical in examining non-military means of defence. Having declared war on Austria-Hungary the British government sent a request through American intermediaries to determine if Liechtenstein was a belligerent or neutral. Prince Johann II, despite his close links with Austria, decided that in the absence of his own military forces, Liechtenstein would remain neutral. This decision was in spite of the customs union Liechtenstein had with Austria-Hungary. Throughout the war the allies applied considerable pressure on Liechtenstein not to export goods to Austria in breach of its neutral status, with which it complied at considerable cost to its own economy. These two issues, neutrality on the basis that it possessed no military and interactions with the allies on the basis that Liechtenstein possessed a sovereignty separate from Austria and Switzerland are key to Liechtenstein's survival as a sovereign state and to its future recognition in the community of nations⁴⁰.

Liechtenstein's lack of a military, even when issues of the close relationship between Austria and Liechtenstein came into play, was a critical determinant for ensuring its recognition as neutral. Had Liechtenstein possessed a military it would have been harder for Prince Johann II to assert neutrality and reject the plight of his Austrian friends and neighbours. It would have also been difficult to not employ the military in support of Austria given the large amount of pro-Austrian feeling amongst the Liechtenstein population⁴¹. Had Liechtenstein become a co-belligerent with Austria then it is reasonable to conclude that the fate that befell the Habsburgs and every other German monarchy in the wake of the Central Powers defeat would have also befallen Liechtenstein. States within the German Empire of similar size and status to Liechtenstein, such as Oldenburg, Baden or Hesse, all had their monarchies deposed and were incorporated into new larger sub entities of the Weimar Republic, any semblance of sovereign status lost⁴². However by 1920 Liechtenstein was the last remaining polity of the Holy Roman Empire still intact. Its security and continued existence had been defended in significant part by the fact that it did not have a military. In the global order at that time its unarmed, sovereign and neutral status was its best defence.

In the economic and political chaos that followed the First World War Liechtenstein moved

⁴⁰ Ibid, 38-40.

⁴¹ Ibid, 39.

⁴² S. Miles Bouten, **And the Kaiser Abdicates**, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1920), 178.

away from Austria and set up a customs and monetary union with its other neighbor Switzerland in 1921⁴³. These arrangements with Switzerland have held to the present day. Liechtenstein applied to join the League of Nations in 1920 but in what was a major setback for its claim to sovereignty it was denied on the grounds of being too small⁴⁴. Despite this Liechtenstein continued to exercise and assert its sovereignty. Liechtenstein remained neutral during the Second World War and raised no military forces to protect itself. The Nazi German regime respected Liechtenstein's neutrality alongside that of Switzerland⁴⁵. The key difference being that Switzerland had mobilized its considerable militia-based army to defend its borders and engaged in numerous skirmishes and encounters with Axis and Allied forces but it was very clear that it would not defend Liechtenstein territory⁴⁶. Liechtenstein was neutral, unarmed and without allies but even in a time of global war and conquest its sovereignty was acknowledged and respected. Liechtenstein was only faced with a security challenge at the end of the war when an armoured battalion of Free Russian Waffen SS troops rolled over the Liechtenstein-Austrian border. These troops were met by a handful of lightly armed Liechtenstein Police. The Free Russians promptly surrendered and sought asylum in Liechtenstein. This asylum was granted and after several years of negotiations, particularly with the Soviet Union who wanted them repatriated as war criminals, the Russians were resettled in Argentina⁴⁷. Once again Liechtenstein's sovereign status allowed them to defy the requests of the Soviet Union that they be repatriated like other Russians interned in Austrian territory, and this policy differentiated them from their neighbours.

Liechtenstein's history has several key milestones in establishing its credentials as a sovereign entity in international law. It was promulgated as an Imperial Principality in 1719, it was recognized by the Congress of Vienna in 1815, and it was further recognized in both world wars where its frontiers and neutrality were acknowledged and respected. It did all of this without a soldier in uniform since 1868, despite sharing a border with a belligerent in both world wars. Since Liechtenstein abolished its Army in 1868 it was granted a new constitution in 1921, which including some amendments remains in force today. Article 44 of the Liechtenstein Constitution states:

1) Every man fit to bear arms shall be required, until the completion of his 60th year, to serve in

⁴³ Jorri Duursma, **Fragmentation and the International Relations of Micro-states**, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 149.

⁴⁴ Jacques Rapaport, Ernest Muteba and Joseph J. Therattil, **Small States and Territories: Status and Problems**, (New York, Arno Press, 1971), 115-117.

⁴⁵ Beattie, 104.

⁴⁶ Ibid, 125-126.

⁴⁷ Beattie, 129-132.

the defence of the country in the event of emergency.

2) Except in this event, armed groups may only be formed and maintained to the extent deemed necessary for the provision of the police force and the preservation of internal order. Further detailed provisions in this regard shall be laid down by law⁴⁸.

According to this constitutional provision not only does Liechtenstein not have a military it is also constitutionally banned from having one except in time of national emergency.

In the post war era Liechtenstein initially struggled economically but worked hard to retain its separate sovereign status, though not yet as a member of the United Nations. As its wealth grew over the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, it began to join more and more international organisations including the Council of Europe, European Free Trade Agreement and the International Court of Justice⁴⁹.

Liechtenstein's Prince and Government were keen to obtain the full badge of sovereignty that UN membership would bring but needed to overcome some domestic political resistance and ensure the international political climate was right to accept a small state like Liechtenstein. Some sections of the public saw UN membership as a risk to the peace and neutrality of the state, where UN membership could embroil Liechtenstein in international disputes which would otherwise not affect the state. The Ruling Prince Hans Adam II was active in pushing for UN membership and over the course of the 1980s he made repeated references to membership in his speeches from the throne. The government supported UN membership but the population remained unconvinced. With a referendum unlikely to succeed legal opinion was sought to ascertain the constitutional requirement for a referendum and as a result the Government took the decision on its own. The UN Security Council and the General Assembly accepted Liechtenstein's application for membership and the Liechtenstein flag was raised in New York on 18 September 1990⁵⁰.

Liechtenstein has become an active member of the UN and its various bodies advocating an agenda that underpins its sovereignty and self-determination. Liechtenstein is active in pursuing an agenda of Human Rights, Security Council Reform and Peace Security and

⁴⁸ **Liechtenstein Constitution**, retrieved from the University of Minnesota Human Rights Collection, <http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/research/liechtenstein-constitution.pdf>

⁴⁹ Duursma, 174-190.

⁵⁰ Beattie, 158-162.

Counter Terrorism⁵¹. Liechtenstein has also gone on to expand its network of diplomatic representation to Vienna, Berne, Brussels, Washington DC and Strassbourg⁵², it has joined the European Economic Area and the Schengen agreement.

Liechtenstein has become a fully functioning member of the community of nations and this is an important part of its overall strategy. Its sovereign status is now historically established through inclusion in instruments like the Congress of Vienna. It has a long record of sovereign recognition from other powers such as the United Kingdom and the United States including in matters of war and neutrality. Foreign Governments have officially received its sovereign and its officials. This historical practice has been added to by Liechtenstein's active diplomacy and engagement in the international system with diplomatic fingerprints across the agencies of the international system. Liechtenstein has created an international sovereign identity that makes any attack on its sovereignty the highest breach of international law. Sitting next to two neutral nations it faces neither threat nor prospect of military aid in a crisis. Just as the Landtag recognized in 1868 that military defence was not a practical option for a state as small as Liechtenstein, so it remains true today that non-military means of diplomatic engagement and advancement of sovereignty remain the state's best method of defending its territory and interests.

Tuvalu

The protections offered by the UN system were also coupled with a vigorous agenda of decolonization that created a large number of new nations, many of which had never existed as nations in any modern sense at any time in their history. Colonial constructions of borders and peoples were transformed from peripheral possession to sovereign state in short order⁵³. Colonial borders drawn up in European capitals that showed little regard for the culture, language and kinship of local peoples were enshrined into international law. Many of these borders had never evolved through the historical Darwinism of war, conquest and demographic change but instead had been imposed clumsily by the commercial and political interests of colonial powers. Tribal communities that had once been loosely connected by linguistic, familial and trade ties were now bound together as Westphalian nation states with all of the associated trappings and responsibilities, including that of defending their new national interests⁵⁴.

⁵¹ Liechtenstein Mission to the United Nations, **Priorities at the United Nations**, (<http://www.regierung.li/priorities-at-the-united-nations-documents/>) .

⁵² Liechtenstein Government, **Diplomatic Representations**, (<http://www.regierung.li/ministries/ministry-for-foreign-affairs/diplomatic-representations/>) .

⁵³ Duursma, 84.

⁵⁴ Stanley A. de Smith, **Microstates and Micronesia: Problems of America's Pacific Islands and Other Minute Territories**, (New York: New York University Press, 1970), 35-52.

One such state that highlights the security challenges of post-colonial sovereignty is the Pacific state of Tuvalu. Tuvalu is a small nation of just 10,000 people spread across nine small atolls in the South Pacific⁵⁵. It has a land area of just 26 square kilometres (just 16% the size of Liechtenstein) spread across an Exclusive Economic Zone of 900,000 square kilometers of Ocean⁵⁶. Tuvaluans are a Polynesian people with cultural and linguistic similarities to Tongans, Samoans, Hawaiians and Maori. The islands shared traditions and culture but were not united politically, instead each island had its own council of elders or *Falekaupule*⁵⁷. While explorers, whalers, traders and missionaries all interacted with the islands of Tuvalu from as early as the 1500s it was not until 1892 that Britain formally asserted colonial possession of the islands by making it a Protectorate of the British Empire under the name of the Ellice Islands within the colonial construct of the British Western Pacific Territories. From 1916, the ethnically Polynesian Ellice Islands were joined with the ethnically Micronesian Gilbert Islands to become the Crown Colony of the Gilbert and Ellice Islands⁵⁸.

The Gilbert and Ellice Islands attracted little interest until the Second World War when the Japanese invaded the Gilberts. The Ellice Islands became a major allied air and sea base and were used for the recapture of the Gilberts, in particular the Makin and Tarawa campaigns. The Ellice Islands themselves were never invaded. The war opened the Ellice Islands to the world and left a legacy of infrastructure in the form of an airfield and port but also considerable environmental damage from this construction.

The Gilbert and Ellice Islands resumed their status as a quiet backwater of the British Empire after the war, but as the United Nations decolonization movement gathered pace and Britain looked to divest itself of responsibilities to the East of Suez, discussion turned to self-government and eventual independence for the Gilbert and Ellice Islands. The Tuvaluan speaking, Polynesian, and less numerous Ellice Islanders did not welcome the prospect of being in independent union with the far more numerous, Gilbertese speaking, Micronesian Gilbert Islanders and so after a referendum in 1974 it was agreed to establish two self-governing territories. In 1978 the Ellice Islands became Tuvalu, retaining Queen Elizabeth II as Head of State⁵⁹. The Gilbert Islands became Kiribati in 1979 as a Parliamentary Republic under

⁵⁵ Central Intelligence Agency, 877-879.

⁵⁶ Tuvalu EEZ Data <http://www.seaaroundus.org/data/#/eez> .

⁵⁷ Talakatoa O'Brien, **Genesis**, in Hugh Laracy (ed.) *Tuvalu: A History*, (Suva: University of the South Pacific Press), 1983, 13-18.

⁵⁸ Noatea P. Teo, **Colonial Rule**, in *Ibid*, 127-129.

⁵⁹ Tuvalu's Commonwealth Status. <http://thecommonwealth.org/our-member-countries/tuvalu/history>

their own President.

Independent Tuvalu had some major challenges to state viability stemming from its small size, dispersed maritime geography, low income economy and poor transport and telecommunication links⁶⁰. From a defence and security perspective it had only a small largely unarmed police force and very limited maritime capabilities to police the islands and the fish rich seas of its EEZ. The constitution of Tuvalu makes reference to the creation of the Tuvalu Police Force but makes no mention of any provision for a military except to say that other state services may be created as required⁶¹. The Prime Minister does have Defence and Security as an issue in his portfolio but with no agency or staff to specifically serve the issue⁶². At the time of independence and in the following two decades it was a reasonable assessment to say that Tuvalu had no likely prospect of an existential security threat, and its security posture reflected that.

Over the course of the 20 years after independence it was also reasonable to say that Tuvalu was also not yet fully in the community of nations. It only had the protections of being a Commonwealth Realm and a member of the Pacific Islands Forum neither of which offered any formal security assurance either in kind or in law⁶³. Indeed due to its size and weak economic position Tuvalu was not well placed to fulfil the responsibilities of membership of international organisations. Progressively over the course of the 1980s and 1990s it joined a number of regional organisations related to fisheries, development and communications largely on a case by case basis driven by national interest. Nonetheless, Tuvalu's sovereign status was not challenged or put under pressure. Its status as a Commonwealth Realm, its limited exercising of an ability to maintain relations with other states, along with a defined territory and population all allowed Tuvalu to build unquestioned sovereignty through practice⁶⁴. In 2000, Tuvalu made the decision to increase its formal independent status by becoming a full rather than special member of the Commonwealth and also formally joined the United Nations as the 189th member state⁶⁵.

⁶⁰ Rapaport, Muteba and Therattil, 88-89.

⁶¹ Section 157 of the Constitution of Tuvalu, http://www.paclii.org/tv/legis/consol_act/cot277/

⁶² Assignment under Section 75(1)(a) of the Constitution, **Ministerial Responsibilities**, http://www.paclii.org/tv/legis/consol_act/cot277/

⁶³ 4.4 Commw. L. Bull. 751, 754 (1978),

http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/commwlb4&div=29&start_page=751&collection=journals&set_as_cursor=70&men_tab=srchresults

⁶⁴ Duursma, 110-132.

⁶⁵ Tuvalu joins the UN. <https://www.un.int/tuvalu/activities/press-release-sqsm7530-secretary-general-welcomes-tuvalu-new-member-united-nations-family>

Tuvalu's strategic situation is free from conventional threats to national security. It does not have land borders and its nearest neighbours are all small island states with neither the design nor the capability to challenge Tuvalu's territory or interests. Tuvalu does have an interest in protecting its natural resources, particularly its fisheries. Its large EEZ contains rich stocks of sought after Tuna species and Tuvalu licences foreign fishing vessels to fish its waters. To meet the requirement to regulate and police this fishing activity Tuvalu participates in the Australian-led Pacific Patrol Boat Program. This program provides patrol boats at no cost to Pacific nations for their military or police forces to operate. The boats are supported by training and technical support including resident Australian Navy maritime surveillance and technical advisers. The three Australian naval personnel in Tuvalu are the only military personnel permanently based in the country⁶⁶.

Tuvalu offers little to major powers seeking to compete with each other with the exception that Tuvalu has chosen to recognize the Republic of China government in Taiwan over recognition of the People's Republic of China⁶⁷. This issue of recognition of China was until recently one of the few issues to bring Tuvalu onto the global diplomatic stage, but the issue of climate change and rising sea levels has become an existential national threat for Tuvalu⁶⁸. This threat has led to the Tuvaluan government taking a centre-stage role in climate change talks at the UN including the Copenhagen and Paris climate change meetings⁶⁹. The issue of rising sea levels in a country whose maximum elevation is three meters above high tide is one that threatens the viability and existence of the state. This goes to the heart of the Copenhagen school of securitisation where, when treated as a threat to the security of the nation, environmental security is far more pressing than any military threat⁷⁰. No military force or capability has the power to reverse or mitigate the effects of climate and rising sea levels on Tuvalu. The only way Tuvalu can deploy its state power to mitigate this threat is through the use of its sovereign status and diplomatic capabilities to build a global agreement to halt and hopefully reverse climate change and sea level rise as well as to build options through international partners to

⁶⁶ Sam Batemen and Anthony Bergin, **Staying the course: Australia and maritime security in the South Pacific**, *Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Strategic Insight* (Vol.52, May 2011), 2.

⁶⁷ Tuvaluan recognition of Taiwan

<http://www.mofa.gov.tw/en/AlliesIndex.aspx?n=DF6F8F246049F8D6&sms=A76B7230ADF29736>

⁶⁸ Apisai Ielemia, **A Threat to our Human Rights: Tuvalu's Perspective on Climate Change**, *UN Chronicle* (Vol. XLIV, No. 2, 2007). Retrieved from <https://unchronicle.un.org/article/threat-our-human-rights-tuvalu-s-perspective-climate-change>

⁶⁹ Tuvalu Engaging on UN Climate Change <http://newsroom.unfccc.int/unfccc-newsroom/tuvalu-submits-its-climate-action-plan-ahead-of-2015-paris-agreement/>

⁷⁰ Roland Dannreuther, **International Security: The Contemporary Agenda**, (Cambridge: Polity, 2013) 47-49.

mitigate the effects from which the country is already suffering⁷¹. In pursuit of this end Tuvaluan leaders engage passionately on the devastating effects climate change is having on their states and the existential threat climate change poses to their nation and their people. This includes chastising the world's only super power when in response to US President Trump's withdrawal of the US from the Paris Climate Deal Tuvalu's Prime Minister Enele Sopoaga said:

"I have instructed my officials not to talk any climate change issues with this country until a new policy is put in place,"

and added: *"I think it doesn't make any sense to talk about any other thing if we don't fix the problem of climate change."*⁷²

Tuvalu's leaders have also used the media and other forms of soft power to influence and mobilise public opinion in larger influential states such as the United States, Britain, Australia and the European Union (EU)⁷³. This has yielded political capital that could influence the policy positions of these states in major climate conferences but also yielded commitments for mitigating aid support to alleviate tidal inundation and damage to fresh water supplies⁷⁴.

For Tuvalu its small land area, large EEZ, small population, small economy and vulnerability to climate change mean its national security equation has neither the financial resources or manpower for military forces nor the security need for military forces. In short there is no realistic threat to Tuvalu's national interests that can be mitigated by the use of force. A Police maritime capability supported by Australian money and advisers manages resource security and the bigger existential security issue of climate change is managed by diplomacy, public affairs and Tuvalu's sovereign status in the community of nations. Without this sovereign status Tuvalu would not have access to the international fora it currently does to put forth its case. The current international system of sovereign states and the United Nations gives Tuvalu the means to defend itself, its people and its interests in a way a military force can not.

Liechtenstein and Tuvalu are not typical states by any means but they are sovereign entities

⁷¹ **Tuvalu's Views on the Possible Security Implications of Climate Change to be included in the report of the UN Secretary General to the UN General Assembly 64th session,** http://www.un.org/esa/dsd/resources/res_pdfs/ga-64/cc-inputs/Tuvalu_CCIS.pdf

⁷² Tuvalu PM reaction to Trump <https://pasifik.news/pacific-leaders-react-us-climate-move-indignation/>

⁷³ Tuvalu Media Engagement on Climate Change <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-08-15/an-tuvalu-president-is-climate-change-27like-a-weapon-of-mass-/5672696>

⁷⁴ Foreign Aid in Support of Climate Change <http://dfat.gov.au/geo/tuvalu/development-assistance/Pages/objective-3-environment-and-climate-change.aspx>

recognized by the global international order as being full members of the community of nations. Neither state has demonstrated a strategic need for the creation of a military force in the modern era, yet both states have increased their global presence and influence through diplomatic and soft power means. Both states have national security interests that have needed to be defended and both states have used non-military means to do so.

Chapter 4 - Defence by Patrons and Partners. Protections offered by to states by alliances.

Liechtenstein and Tuvalu are two states that have used the existing global order to go it alone and secure their interests by non-military means, but not every state feels that it has the right strategic circumstances to do this. Some states feel that their strategic situation requires an insurance policy of armed force to be available *in extremis*. This has resulted in a number of small states developing alliance and arrangements with larger states to provide for their security needs without having to maintain military forces themselves. This has been done through membership of collective security arrangements with other armed states or bilateral arrangements with a larger armed power. In both cases the unarmed state has to have something strategic, symbolic or tangible to give in return for the blood and treasure of another state to be used in its defence⁷⁵. The participation in these alliances can also be used as a tool of statecraft to secure unilateral interests particularly in asymmetric bargaining with larger powers.

Iceland

Iceland has chosen the alliance path towards security as a member of NATO, but unlike every other member of NATO, Iceland possesses no military forces⁷⁶. Iceland has the capacity to police its land and maritime domains and maintain situational awareness of its air domain. For all other forms of defence Iceland relies on NATO members to provide forces and capacity.

Iceland's unarmed status has been the case since it declared its independence from Denmark during the Second World War⁷⁷. To hold its strategically vital territory in support of allied attempts to secure Atlantic and Arctic shipping routes, Iceland was invaded by Britain and met no resistance. With Denmark having no ability to rule while being occupied by Germany the Icelandic Parliament, the Althing, took over control of foreign policy and in 1944, Iceland was declared a republic⁷⁸.

After the war allied forces left but in the absence of their own military forces and with a view to the Soviet Union tightening its grip on Eastern Europe, Iceland agreed to join NATO in 1949. This decision caused significant internal unrest in Iceland where the long held principle of

⁷⁵ Dannreuther, 113-116.

⁷⁶ International Institute for Strategic Studies, 108.

⁷⁷ Central Intelligence Agency, 395.

⁷⁸ Baldur Porhallsson, **What features determine small states' activities in the international arena? Iceland's approach to foreign relations until the mid-1990's**, *Stjórnmal og Stjórnsýsla*, (Autumn 2005, Vol.1(1)), 114.

neutrality was highly regarded. Harder heads prevailed and once again, due to the importance of Icelandic geography in monitoring Soviet surface, submarine and air traffic US forces returned to Iceland under the 1951 Defence Agreement⁷⁹.

The Iceland-US Defence Agreement is an agreement of eight short articles that gave bases in Iceland to US forces to operate out of. It did not specify the number of US forces posted to the country but it did acknowledge that numbers needed to be agreed with the Government of Iceland⁸⁰. The US forces were known as the Iceland Defense Force and over the years included an air element that provided air policing and air space surveillance, naval elements including naval aviation for maritime patrol and a contingent of Marines for ground defence. All up during the Cold War the Iceland Defense Force consisted of just over 1000 personnel and included small numbers of military members from other NATO countries such as the UK, Norway and the Netherlands⁸¹. The Iceland Defense Force served from 1951 until 2006 when the US and NATO decided that it was no longer required and it was disbanded and facilities handed back to Iceland. Despite the initial reluctance of the Icelandic population to join NATO in the late 1940s the US decision to remove its last forces from Iceland was met with considerable disappointment from Icelanders and their government⁸².

Despite the disbandment of the Iceland Defense Force, Iceland still possessed vital strategic geography as it related to Russian air and sea movements. Following a number of Russian incursions into Icelandic air space the Icelandic Government made a request to NATO through the North Atlantic Council for rotational air policing from other NATO members. This was agreed to in mid-2007 and the first deployment of French fighter aircraft arrived in May 2008. Successive deployments have continued to the present day⁸³.

With Iceland's geography still strategically relevant to NATO it has been able to continue the policy of not maintaining military forces. With the existential and grand strategic interests met by NATO Iceland has chosen to only possess law enforcement capabilities, capabilities that have, nonetheless, actively pursued Iceland's national interests and contributed to Iceland's international security commitments. Iceland has two law enforcement organisations, the Iceland National Police and the Icelandic Coast Guard. It also has a mechanism to deploy both Police

⁷⁹ Valur Ingimundarson, **Britain, the United States and Militarisation of Iceland 1945-1951**, *Scandinavian Journal of History* (Vol.37, Issue 2, 2012), 208-212.

⁸⁰ **Defense of Iceland: Agreement Between the United States and the Republic of Iceland, May 5, 1951**, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/ice001.asp

⁸¹ Iceland Defense Force <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dod/idf.htm>

⁸² Valur Ingimundarson, **Iceland's Security Dilemma: The End of a U.S. Military Presence**. (31.1 Fletcher F. World Affairs. 7, 24 (2007)), 15.

⁸³ Icelandic Air Policing <https://www.shape.nato.int/icelands-peace-time-preparedness-needs>

and Coastguard members through the Iceland Crisis Response Unit. This unit is an ad hoc creation and consists of a list of around 200 qualified Coastguard and Police personnel who are deployed in small numbers to support NATO, EU or UN missions and is operated by the Icelandic Ministry of Foreign Affairs⁸⁴.

The Icelandic Coast Guard is not a military force. The Coastguard possesses a number of patrol boats and those patrol boats have light armaments including small arms for the crew and machine guns. It also has a single maritime patrol aircraft and three search and rescue helicopters, all unarmed. The Coast Guard also maintains the Icelandic Air Surveillance centre which uses ground based radars to monitor Icelandic airspace⁸⁵. Despite this non-military status the Coast Guard has, at times, been very active in its pursuit of defending Iceland's national interests. The most visible example of this was in the so-called Cod Wars with the United Kingdom.

The Cod Wars were a disagreement between the United Kingdom and Iceland that resulted in a number of confrontations from 1952 to 1976⁸⁶. It was a dispute that contributed to changes in maritime law and the creation of Exclusive Economic Zones and was an example of non-military action being used to defend and extend a nation's national interests. Following independence from Denmark, Iceland began to look at its foreign relations and key international agreements to see that they met Iceland's national interests. The most important industry at the time was fishing and Iceland was keen to revisit earlier UK-Denmark agreements on fishing to ensure that Iceland's national interests were being met to the fullest extent. In 1949, Iceland began a process of abrogating the previous agreements and in 1952 extended the three nautical mile fishing zone to four nautical miles around Iceland's coast that was for the exclusive use of Icelandic fisherman to the exclusion of others without a license. The others were primarily British fisherman from Northern ports who depended on the waters around Iceland for their catch and a viable industry. Britain responded by banning the import of Icelandic fish which caused considerable harm to the Icelandic industry⁸⁷.

In this instance a small power being economically coerced by a larger power seemed to be a logical and effective way for Britain to assert its power and secure its interests over the interests of Iceland. What Britain failed to appreciate was Iceland's strategic value in the

⁸⁴ International Crisis Response Unit <https://www.mfa.is/foreign-policy/development-cooperation/icru/>

⁸⁵ Icelandic Coast Guard <http://www.lhg.is/english>

⁸⁶ Sverrir Steinsson, **The Cod Wars: A Re-Analysis**, *European Security* (Vol. 25, Issue 2, 2016), 258.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

context of the Cold War. The international response to the British import ban was that the Soviet Union, seeking both greater influence with Iceland and division in NATO, offered to buy more Icelandic fish to offset the loss of the British market. This in turn prompted the United States to also start buying Icelandic fish and encouraged other NATO members to do the same. Britain found itself isolated and was forced to concede to Iceland and recognize the new four nautical mile limit in 1956⁸⁸. Iceland had not even had to deploy its Coastguard to defend and extend its interests. It instead made use of its geographic strategic value to major powers and used that as a bargaining chip to secure its objectives.

Perhaps emboldened by their success and recognizing the strength of their strategic position, Iceland decided in 1958 to further extend the fishing zone to 12 nautical miles, a unilateral extension that was opposed by Britain and by NATO⁸⁹. Britain took a harder line this time and sent warships to protect British fishing vessels operating in the disputed area. This was a major escalation in relation to NATO where one NATO member was using military assets against another⁹⁰. Iceland's small Coastguard which was seeking to enforce the new fishing zone was completely outgunned against the more numerous, modern warships of the Royal Navy that were protecting the British trawlers. Despite this the Icelandic Coastguard continued to attempt to enforce fisheries regulations, as a law enforcement function, despite the coercive presence of the British warships leading to a number of confrontations including the firing of warning shots by the Icelanders and threats to sink the Icelandic vessels by the Royal Navy⁹¹. These confrontations and the string British military approach to the issue led to Iceland threatening to withdraw from NATO. Once again Iceland played its strategic geography card in a confrontation where resort to force would lead to Icelandic defeat. NATO immediately began to mediate the dispute, with Iceland's strategic value outweighing the interests of British fishermen. In 1961, Britain agreed to the Icelandic 12 nautical mile limit but received some concessions to fish for a limited period in the outer six nautical miles of the Icelandic zone. This result was very similar to the arrangement Iceland had offered Britain at the beginning of the dispute. Despite the coercive influence of one of the world's most powerful navies, Iceland won the day. It secured the maritime zone it desired at the expense of British interests⁹². Military power offered no solution to this problem as Britain found out to its cost.

⁸⁸ Gudni Th. Johannesson, **To the Edge of Nowhere: US-Icelandic Defense Relations during and after the Cold War**, *Naval War College Review*, (Vol. LVII, No.3/4, 2004), 118-119.

⁸⁹ *Ibid*, 121.

⁹⁰ Steinsson, 267.

⁹¹ Paddy Johnston, **The Cod Wars against Iceland: The Royal Navy as political instrument**, *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, (Vol.5:2, 1991), 11-13.

⁹² Johannesson, 121-122.

The final and perhaps decisive episode of the Cod Wars occurred in the early 1970s. Iceland once again decided to increase its exclusive fishing zone, this time from 12 nautical miles out to 50 nautical miles. Britain, NATO and the Soviet sphere countries all opposed the extension but it was supported in the international community by many former colonial states who saw the Icelandic precedent as a way to secure greater control over and profit from their marine resources⁹³.

Iceland began enforcement operations of the new zone immediately using net cutters to cut the trawling lines of foreign fishing vessels⁹⁴. Britain responded once again by sending in the Royal Navy and once again a number of confrontations between the small but tenacious Icelandic Coastguard and the Royal Navy ensued. As the confrontations escalated so too did Icelandic rhetoric about leaving NATO and once again NATO intervened to mediate a solution⁹⁵. This time Britain temporarily agreed to the new limits in return for limited fishing rights within the new zone with a catch limit applied.

This new arrangement was short lived as Iceland, emboldened by the 1975 Law of the Sea Conference which had seriously discussed extending the Exclusive Economic Zone out to 100 nautical miles, decided to extend its fishing zone out to 200 nautical miles. The dance of warship, trawler and Coastguard vessel resumed and there were a number of warning shots, collisions and rammings between the parties to the dispute. Iceland brought the US into the dispute by claiming that NATO was not protecting the interests of the Icelandic people and that it may need to close the US airbase at Keflavik. This would have been a serious strategic blow to the US and NATO's ability to defend against the Soviet submarine threat and pressure was applied to Britain to withdraw⁹⁶. The Icelandic fishing industry was protected and enhanced at the expense of the British industry which was decimated in Northern fishing ports like Hull and Grimsby. The 200 nautical mile limit established a precedent that was codified in the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea that went beyond just fishing rights but guaranteed exclusive rights to all economic activity inside the zone, in particular access to mineral resources⁹⁷.

Iceland possesses strategic geography that is valuable to major powers and the ownership of this geography has proven to be a profitable strategic asset in the pursuit of Icelandic interests.

⁹³ Valur Ingimundarson, **Fighting the Cod Wars in the Cold War: Iceland's challenge to the Western Alliance in the 1970s**, *The RUSI Journal*, (Vol. 148:3, 2003), 89.

⁹⁴ Johnston, 13.

⁹⁵ Ingimundarson, 89-92.

⁹⁶ Johannesson, 125-127.

⁹⁷ History of the Law of the Sea Convention

http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_historical_perspective.htm#Historical%20Perspective

Through membership of the NATO alliance Iceland offers strategic value to the alliance over and above any contribution that military forces could provide. The alliance context provided the right framework for Iceland to be successful in the asymmetric bargaining process that was the Cod Wars⁹⁸. Military forces would have been of no utility to Iceland in pursuing its interests for a greater fishing zone. Indeed possessing military forces at the time of the Cod Wars, in the face of British military coercion, may have given cause for the Icelandic government to have used them. This would have changed the nature of the dispute into one that was not in Iceland's favour. By relying on the international system that valued its sovereignty and utilizing its value to the NATO alliance Iceland effectively gained territory at the expense of a major power without using military assets or military force.

With the precedent of the Cold War and the Cod Wars in mind it is perhaps unsurprising that Iceland has not felt compelled to develop military forces of its own. The nature of the security environment in the far North Atlantic is such that when Russia presents a threat it is in the context of broader great power confrontation and as a consequence there is an acceptance on the part of NATO to provide materially for the defence of Iceland. When the security environment with Russia is benign then there is no threat for Iceland and no requirement for forces⁹⁹. Iceland has used its alliance with NATO to not only provide the assurance of defence in the worst case scenario of existential threat but it has also been a valuable tool in advancing Icelandic interests in bilateral disputes.

The Pacific Compact States

The grand calculus of the Cold War in the North Atlantic provided Iceland with the bargaining chips it needed to secure its defence and concurrently pursue its national interest. Outside of this high-stakes, high-value arena small states sometimes need to look to a larger patron to secure their interests. An example occurs in the Central Pacific where three countries, Palau, Micronesia and Marshall Islands have all entered into Compacts of Free Association with the United States in order to provide security and a degree of prosperity to their small and fragile nations.

The three Compact states all have a relatively short but complicated colonial past. From the mid-16th century the territory now occupied by the three states was claimed by Spain and ruled as the Spanish East Indies, a subsidiary colony of the Spanish Philippines. Spain was defeated

⁹⁸ Steinsson, 270-271.

⁹⁹ Alison JK Bailes and Kristmundur por Olafsson, **Developments in Icelandic Security Policy**, *Icelandic Review of Policy and Administration*, (Volume 10, No. 2, 2014), 1-16.

by the United States in the Spanish-American War of 1898 and lost the Philippines and Guam as a result. Deciding that the rest of the Spanish East Indies were not viable Spain sold the territories to an imperially hungry Germany. This did not last as the First World War allowed for the sparsely defended islands to be seized by Japan. As part of the victorious allies in the First World War Japan retained the islands as a League of Nations mandate territory after the war¹⁰⁰.

Some 20 years later the Japanese used many of the islands as bases to project power across the Pacific in the Second World War. The US fought hard to secure these islands as part of GEN MacArthur's island hopping campaign. Major battles such as Peleilu, Kwajelein and Truk Lagoon displaced the Japanese at considerable human cost to both sides¹⁰¹.

After the war the United States was awarded the territories as United Nations Trust Territories. The US used some of the remote islands in what is now the Republic of the Marshall Islands to conduct nuclear testing including the largest US atmospheric nuclear test codenamed Castle Bravo which completely destroyed an island in the Eniwetok Atoll chain and contaminated the surrounding area for decades to come¹⁰². The US granted independence to the Trust Territory creating three new states, the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) in 1979¹⁰³, the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) in 1979¹⁰⁴ and finally the Republic of Palau in 1994¹⁰⁵.

All three of these states were small in terms of their land area and population but following the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea they all have extensive Exclusive Economic Zones. FSM for example has a land area of just 702 square kilometers but it has an EEZ of 2.98 million square kilometers¹⁰⁶. Despite the potential of marine resources all three states are poor with limited natural resources and face the difficulty of dispersed populations on small and fragile islands and atolls. With a combined population of only 200,000 people the issue of defending these newly independent states was a difficult problem.

While no immediate aggressor was apparent the 1980s was an era of Super Power confrontation and still bitter from the experience of Pearl Harbour in the Second World War the United States was keen to ensure that the Pacific remained within its sphere of control¹⁰⁷.

¹⁰⁰ de Smith, 122-124.

¹⁰¹ Ibid, 126-129.

¹⁰² Ibid, 135.

¹⁰³ <https://www.doi.gov/oia/islands/fsm>

¹⁰⁴ <https://www.doi.gov/oia/islands/marshallislands>

¹⁰⁵ <https://www.doi.gov/oia/islands/palau>

¹⁰⁶ <http://www.fao.org/fishery/facp/FSM/en#CountrySector-GenGeoEconReport>

¹⁰⁷ Amitav Acharya, **The Asia-Pacific Region: Cockpit for Superpower Rivalry**, *The World Today*, Vol. 43, No. 8/9 (Aug. - Sep., 1987), pp. 155-158.

Thus as part of the move towards independence the US began negotiations with individual states to create Compacts of Free Association between each state and the United States¹⁰⁸. The premise was clear for each side. For the United States they would gain control of the Defence of the three states and have the ability to build bases and conduct military activities. For the Compact states they gained protection from the United States in the event of a threat and a package of economic support to offset the loss of control of a sphere of their sovereignty. The military provisions also allowed citizens of the Compact States to participate in the defence of their countries by joining the United States armed forces¹⁰⁹. The precise terms of each Compact are slightly different and they took a number of years to negotiate as both parties sought to maximize unilateral benefit.

One key component of the Compacts of Free Association was the retention of full sovereignty by the three Compact States. In other arrangements states have ceded elements of sovereignty in return for financial or physical security, such as the Cook Islands arrangements with New Zealand¹¹⁰ or the arrangements in place between Britain and many of its overseas territories like the Cayman Islands, Bermuda or Gibraltar¹¹¹. This had meant that these territories have degrees of autonomy but are not independent in a sovereign sense. In contrast, the Compact states are all UN members and engage in their own foreign policies including sending and receiving Ambassadors. By contrast the Cook Islands, Bermuda, Cayman Islands and Gibraltar are all members of the Commonwealth, all use their own currency and all have their own police forces, courts and elected assemblies, but they are not members of the UN and are not considered sovereign in international law.

The effect of these Compacts on the defence and security of the three states has been to have the military protection of the world's only superpower. Thus, for existential military threats, the Compact States sit under the most secure umbrella on earth. In addition as the citizens of all three states are permitted to serve in the US military they can actively participate in the force that provides that security. This is something that the citizens of all three states have done in great numbers with all three states having higher recruitment rates for the US military than any actual state of the United States. This has come at cost too where the casualty rate amongst FSM, RMI and Paluan populations during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq was higher than

¹⁰⁸ Compacts of Free Association <http://uscompact.org/about/cofa.php>

¹⁰⁹ Donald R. Shuster, **The Republic of Palau and its Compact, 1995–2009**, *The Journal of Pacific History*, Volume 44:3, 2009, 329-330.

¹¹⁰ Cook Islands Relationship with New Zealand <http://www.ck/govt.htm#nz>

¹¹¹ Foreign and Commonwealth Office (UK), **The Overseas Territories: Security, Success and Sustainability**, (London: The Stationary Office, 2012), 8-9.

anywhere in the United States¹¹².

The model of ceding defence to a major power does come with some problems. The first problem is the nature of the threat posed to the small state and the capacity of the patron state to deal with it. In the case of the Compact States the risk of military invasion is low and the capacity of the US as patron to repel and defeat any such attack is high. However the biggest threat to the Compact States comes not in the form of an invasion force but in the form of threats such as illegal, unregulated or unreported fishing and transnational crime¹¹³. These issues, in large part, fall outside the scope of the Compact Arrangements. This means that while the US navy has free right of passage and operation in the waters of the Compact States they are ill equipped and not resourced to conduct fisheries or policing patrols. The US agency best equipped to undertake this kind of activity is the US Coast Guard which does not have the authority under the Compact arrangements to operate in the waters of the Compact States or enforce their laws. In this instance all three compact states have turned to Australia who have provided Patrol Boats and advisers under the Pacific Patrol Boat Program¹¹⁴.

Perceived inaction on these matters as well as issues such as environmental clean up from nuclear testing and the general levels of funding and services to be provided by the Compact has created tense relationships between the US and the Compact States¹¹⁵. The Compacts were renewed with some amendments in 2003 for another 20 years so that in 2023 the Compact States, as sovereign entities, are entitled to review the nature of any new Compact agreement proposed by the United States and make sovereign decisions on whether that represents the best deal for their states. Likewise the United States can make a determination that a Compact of Free Association is no longer in its interests and reduce or eliminate the arrangement¹¹⁶.

This variable approach where renegotiation and reassessment is part of the process allows for

¹¹² Compact States Military Recruitment and Casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan
<https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2010/0505/Uncle-Sam-wants-Micronesians-for-US-military>

¹¹³ UNODC, **Transnational Crime in the South Pacific: A Threat Assessment 2016**,
https://www.unodc.org/documents/southeastasiaandpacific/Publications/2016/2016.09.16_TOC_TA_Pacific_web.pdf

¹¹⁴ Anthony Bergin and Sam Bateman, **Law and Order at Sea and the contribution of the Pacific Patrol Boat Project**, *Ocean and Coastal Management* (Vol.42, 1999), 555-568.

¹¹⁵ FSM discontent with Compact <http://www.guampdn.com/story/news/2015/12/03/fsm-seeks-end-compact-agreement-us/76755600/>

¹¹⁶ Robert A. Underwood, **The Amended US Compacts of Free Association with the Federated States of Micronesia and the Republic of Marshall Islands: Less Free, More Compact**, *East West Centre Working Papers*, (Pacific Islands Development Series, No.16, September 2003), 10-12.

sovereign interests to be evaluated against the merits of any agreement but it also provides less certainty than membership of a more long-term alliance such as Iceland's relationship with NATO. The asymmetric negotiating position that Iceland has in relation to its strategic location gives Iceland benefits that the Compact States, at this stage, are unable to replicate. This creates a situation where the Compact States need the employment, economic and service benefits of the Compact more than the US needs the Compact States strategically. This is the reverse of the Iceland bargaining position and places the Compact States at a disadvantage in their negotiations with the US. The only strategic issue that could give the Compact States more weight is the rise of China. While Pacific Island states are not at the top of the list of China's strategic interests, Beijing is expanding its influence there and it is a region where a modest investment can have significant regional effects. This power game could generate renewed US interest in the strategic value of the Compact States but it could also bring insecurity¹¹⁷.

As described a Compact of Free Association Arrangement with a major power as a means of providing for a small state's defence has some problems. While the protection of the world's only superpower does almost eliminate the prospect of invasion it does little to combat the threats that actually influence the Compact States on a daily basis such as illegal fishing and transnational crime. Add to this the dependence on Compact funds that has developed and the fact that the citizens of these countries are still fighting and dying in wars far from their homes, pursuing goals far removed from the interests of their homelands and the benefits for security that a Compact creates start to appear thin. Although the Compact of Free Association keeps the FSM, RMI and Palau safe from invasion and annexation it has left some fundamentals of security for these states unaddressed. These unaddressed issues are more likely and more immediately consequential than the unlikely existential threats the US is able to prevent.

¹¹⁷ Joanne Wallis, **Crowded and Complex: The changing geopolitics of the South Pacific**, (Barton: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2017), 9-13.

Chapter 5 – Defence from self harm

The international system and networks of alliances may prove useful in providing defence from external threats but they are of little use to protect a state from itself. Civil wars, insurgencies and coups d'état have been common features of the post-Second World War order¹¹⁸. Since the Second World War and the beginning of the current UN-dominated era many militaries have only used force on their own citizens rather than in self-defence against an external aggressor. In many countries military forces have been more geared towards internal threats and regime protection than towards defence from an external aggressor¹¹⁹. Where militaries become focused on politics and internal affairs it can become something that the people and the state itself need to be defended against rather than being the means of defence. In recognition of this fact a number of countries have taken the revolutionary step of disbanding their militaries following civil wars or military regimes and have pursued the non-military path.

Costa Rica

Perhaps the most famous country without armed forces is the Central American republic of Costa Rica. Everything about Costa Rica's geography and strategic circumstance suggests that a military may be useful in defending its territory and national interests. It maintains two coastlines on the Caribbean Sea and Pacific Ocean and it shares land borders with Nicaragua and Panama, both of whom have suffered from civil war or invasion. It occupies territory that is a vector for international narcotics smuggling on a scale as to threaten the national security of a small state¹²⁰. Indeed this trade has impacted the national security of much larger nearby states such as Colombia and Mexico where a military response has been required to combat that threat. Costa Rica is not a part of any regional collective security arrangement or alliance with a larger power, it is entirely dependent on its own capabilities for its own defence. Despite all of these factors Costa Rica refuses to develop a military and instead relies on a national police force called *Fuerza Publica* or Public Force to provide police, border security and coastguard functions under a civilian Commissioner of Police¹²¹. The reasons for this lie in Costa Rica's past.

Costa Rica like most Central American countries is a former Spanish colony that was part of

¹¹⁸ Paul D. Williams, **War**, in Paul D. Williams (ed.), *Security Studies: An Introduction*, (2nd Edition), (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), 194-195.

¹¹⁹ Caitlin Talmadge, **Different Threats, Different Militaries: Explaining Organizational Practices in Authoritarian Armies**, *Security Studies*, (Vol.25:1, 2016), 113.

¹²⁰ Central Intelligence Agency, 206-210.

¹²¹ IISS, 392.

the Viceroyalty of New Spain and its largely autonomous subdivision the Capitancy-General of Guatemala. Independence came without a fight in 1821 as Spain lost its grip on its Central American provinces after being defeated in the Mexican War of Independence and the old provinces found themselves as independent states. Two years later, as two camps of Costa Rican society emerged, one favouring joining the Mexican Empire and one favouring full independence, and they resorted to civil war to settle their differences. The Republicans were victorious and the Republic of Costa Rica was established¹²².

Costa Rica developed considerably over the 19th and 20th Centuries. It was a backwater of the Spanish Empire, in part due to restrictive trade policies, so with independence came economic growth and in particular the development of the banana and coffee industries. While it had less instability and internal strife than other Latin American states, between independence and 1948 eight Presidents were deposed by coups or uprisings. The last uprising was the Civil War in 1948 that came about over a disputed Presidential election during which revolutionary forces overthrew the government. The uprising's leader Jose Figueres Ferrer was successful in using his own militia, the Caribbean Legion, to defeat both the Costa Rican Army and a Communist militia and establishing himself as provisional President. Figueres set about enacting a number of social reforms in Costa Rica, chief among which was the abolition of the Armed Forces¹²³.

Figueres was no pacifist as his use of force to overthrow the Government demonstrated. Likewise the Costa Rican Army was a small force of less than 500 soldiers with little conventional capability for either power projection or national defence, a fact highlighted by their defeat¹²⁴. Figueres was instead concerned about the loyalty and destabilizing nature of the military. The fact that it served no practical defensive purpose only added to his desire to remove it. As a revolutionary Figueres was of the view that the people would rise up against an invader or aggressor and an army was redundant. He abolished the Army because of his view that militarism was undercutting democracy in Central America¹²⁵.

Over the almost 70 years since the Costa Rican Army was abolished the stability of Costa Rica and the economic trajectory that stability has enabled have been in stark contrast to militarised countries in its neighbourhood such as Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala, who

¹²² John A. Booth, Christine J. Wade, Thomas W. Walker, **Understanding Central America: Global Forces, Rebellion and Change**, (6th Edition), (Boulder: Westview Press, 2015), 55-59.

¹²³ Ibid, 72-74.

¹²⁴ Kirk Bowman, **Militaries and Modern States: The Comparative Evidence from Costa Rica and Honduras**, in Peter N. Stearns (ed.), *Demilitarisation in the Contemporary World*, (Urbana IL: University of Illinois Press, 2013), 191.

¹²⁵ Ibid, 189-195.

all endured multiple coups and bloody civil wars over the same period¹²⁶. Costa Rica has been free of military coups and has maintained orderly transfers of power between Presidents. Its security has been maintained by lightly armed police forces that have neither the capability nor the culture required to overthrow the government¹²⁷.

Costa Rica also highlights another aspect of non-military defence, which is that if a state has a military then it may be tempted or pressured to use it. As we saw in the Liechtenstein example earlier in this paper, the absence of a military avoided the question of how it was to be employed in conflict and on whose side. In Costa Rica, even through the height of the civil war in neighbouring Nicaragua, the Public Force was sufficient to guard the borders and avoid the conflict spilling over. On the other side of Nicaragua was Honduras where a military dominated regime gained favour from the United States for providing bases and military back up to the Nicaraguan Rebel Group known as the Contras. This strengthened the power of the military in Honduras and made democracy and progress more elusive for Honduras over the 1980s and 1990s¹²⁸.

Honduras and Costa Rica were very similar states in the early part of the 20th Century but diverged in 1948 when Costa Rica took the non-military road and Honduras doubled down on strengthening military institutions in partnership with the United States. Costa Rica and the more recently de-militarised Panama now far outpace their militarised Central American neighbours in terms of democratic governance, Human Development, economic prosperity, transparency and safety and security¹²⁹. They are safer, richer, healthier, better educated and more free than the rest of the region¹³⁰. This again raises the question of the utility of a military in a small state, if directly comparable societies are better off when the military is abolished rather than when it is in existence to notionally protect the sovereignty, prosperity and dignity of the state and its people.

In addition to Costa Rica the Latin American and Caribbean nations of Haiti¹³¹, Panama¹³², Dominica¹³³ and Grenada¹³⁴ have also all made conscious decisions to eliminate their military

¹²⁶ Booth, Wade and Walker, 89-90.

¹²⁷ Costa Rica Police Capability <http://www.coha.org/costa-rica-an-army-less-nation-in-a-problem-prone-region/>

¹²⁸ Bowman, 209.

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ Costa Rica comparative development data <http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/rankings.pdf>

¹³¹ CIA, 378.

¹³² Ibid, 659.

¹³³ Ibid, 248.

¹³⁴ Ibid, 348-351.

forces due to the destabilising influence they have had on their nations. Coups, attempted coups, militarisation that led to invasion and the use of military weapons by militia groups have been factors in these countries that have hampered development and cost the lives of citizens. The military in these states did not defend the state or the people but it created conditions where the people suffered the privations of violence and insecurity. The militaries themselves became the greatest threat to peace and security in the countries they were charged to protect. Panama, Dominica and Grenada are all more prosperous and more secure since the removal of their military forces and while Haiti continues to be a work in progress it does not have a military to interfere with democracy or take resources from its recovery.

Chapter 6 – Outlook and Conclusion.

Outlook

The existing UN based international system is critical for the continued security of small states without militaries. The current rules based international system is centred on the institution of the United Nations and the concepts of sovereignty and sovereign equality¹³⁵. Membership of the United Nations affords a state the protections to its sovereignty afforded by the United Nations Charter and it gives a state a vote in the General Assembly that is of equal value with all other members. The vote of Tuvalu or Liechtenstein is of equal status to the vote of Germany or Brazil. On top of these sensible and egalitarian principles sits the first paradox of the UN system, that of the permanent veto wielding members of the Security Council, a diplomatic-bureaucratic manifestation of the Orwellian concept that some are more equal than others¹³⁶.

The permanent members of the Security Council are the winners of the Second World War who set up the new international system in a way that gave them advantage and acted as a safety valve to the superpower rivalry that existed between the United States and the Soviet Union. While China has always been a member of the Security Council, the China that helped build the system, the Republic of China (ROC), is not the China that occupies the Security Council seat today, the Peoples Republic of China (PRC)¹³⁷. The rules and the nature of the system were not of the People's Republic's creation and as the PRC has grown in military, diplomatic and economic power the desire for an international rules based order that better reflects China's interests and world-view grows too¹³⁸.

Added to this is the fact that since 1945 states that at that time were minor powers or did not exist as independent sovereign entities, either by military defeat and occupation or colonisation, are now major powers on the world stage. India, Japan, Germany and Brazil all have large populations, large economies and considerable military potential, including nuclear weapons in India's case. The world has changed but the international structures that govern it have not¹³⁹.

A desire to change these systems is a concern to small states whose security, sovereignty and status are guaranteed and enshrined by the current global order. Sovereign equality is a

¹³⁵ <http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-i/>

¹³⁶ <http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-v/index.html>

¹³⁷ UN Resolution 2758.

[http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/2758\(XXVI\)](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/2758(XXVI))

¹³⁸ Andrew Hurrell, **Hegemony, Liberalism and Global Order: What Space for Would-Be Great Powers?**, in *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)*, (Vol. 82, No. 1, Perspectives on Emerging Would-Be Great Powers Jan., 2006), 2.

¹³⁹ Nadin, Peter, **UN Security Council Reform**, (Berlin: Taylor and Francis, 2016). 52-59.

relatively new concept and not as rock solid as might be thought. Until the Second World War states recognized each other diplomatically but to different degrees. Major powers would exchange Ambassadors but smaller powers would only be accredited to the level of Minister or Envoy¹⁴⁰. Historically in Europe, particularly in the Holy Roman Empire, states of different rank existed depending on the title and status of their sovereign. An Emperor was superior to a King who was superior to a Grand Duke who was superior to Dukes, Princes and Sovereign Counts. In the Diet of the Holy Roman Empire in 1792 this was reflected in voting rights where the eight members of the Council of Electors had a vote for selecting the Emperor and a single vote in ordinary matters. There was then the Council of Princes who could not vote for the Emperor but whose sovereign status entitled them to a single vote on ordinary matters of the diet. There were then a number of single vote Colleges, where groups of up to 30 Princes, Counts and Bishops formed a College that was entitled to one vote on ordinary matters¹⁴¹. Gaining a single sovereign vote was what the Princes of Liechtenstein sought through their purchase of the Principality because it had the appropriate sovereign status.

If major powers in the present day were to attempt to alter the notion of sovereign equality to better reflect the true status and power of states then this could undermine the sovereign protections small states currently enjoy. In practical terms beyond the Security Council it could be argued that this is already occurring. Groupings of states that assign status over and above other states already exist particularly in the economic realm. The G7, G20 and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) all give states an economic status, influence and power greater than non-members of these groups. Should China and Russia and the next tier of powers such as Germany, Japan, India and Brazil be successful in reshaping the existing order or creating new or parallel structures then the inviolate sovereign status enshrined by the equality of states in the UN system could come under threat. Any development of regional hegemony or spheres of influence would be detrimental to the ability of small states to assert their rights of self-determination.

Conclusion

This paper has demonstrated that for a small state defence without a military is not a radical approach in a world where conventional military warfare is becoming less common. The threats to nations and their interests in the current era are generally not from the armoured divisions

¹⁴⁰ Changes to Diplomatic Rank <http://opil.ouplaw.com/page/vienna-and-the-codification-of-diplomatic-law>

¹⁴¹ Structure of the Holy Roman Empire http://www.napoleon-series.org/research/government/c_holyroman.html

and bomber squadrons of the 20th Century. Small states use the international system to safeguard their territory and interests, they use alliances to bolster their positions when faced with larger threats and they use demilitarisation to eliminate the threat that armies pose to their own people. These concepts of sovereignty, alliance and demilitarisation are interlinked and underpinned by the international system. The current UN based system of sovereign states is the overarching framework within which sit alliances and regional security arrangements. These alliances and an ordered international system create an environment where a nation can demilitarise without risking conquest or collapse. It is the international system therefore which is both the greatest guarantor of security for small states and the greatest threat if that system is changed.

Small states will always need to be agile and use the systems of larger states to their advantage. In this Liechtenstein offers a lesson to other small states. Of the over 300 states represented at the 1792 meeting of the Reichstag of the Holy Roman Empire, only Liechtenstein remains. Liechtenstein represents the pinnacle of what a small state can achieve. Through use of the international system, diplomacy and guile Liechtenstein navigated through Napoleon, Bismarck and Hitler to remain a sovereign, internationally recognised state, whose people have enjoyed 200 years of peace and prosperity in excess of their larger neighbours. It has done so without firing a shot and without a man or woman in military uniform since 1868¹⁴².

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

1. Jan Angstrom and Isabelle Duyvesteyn (eds.), **Modern war and the Utility of Force: Challenges, Methods and Strategy**, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010).
2. David Beattie, **Liechtenstein: A Modern History**, (London: I B Taurus, 2004).

¹⁴² Beattie, 30.

3. John A. Booth, Christine J. Wade, Thomas W. Walker, **Understanding Central America: Global Forces, Rebellion and Change**, (6th Edition), (Boulder: Westview Press, 2015).
4. S. Miles Bouten, **And the Kaiser Abdicates**, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1920).
5. Terry F. Buss with Adam Gardner, **Haiti in the Balance: Why Foreign Aid has failed and what we can do about it**, (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2008).
6. Central Intelligence Agency, **CIA World Fact Book 2017**, (New York: Skyhorse, 2016).
7. Roland Dannreuther, **International Security: The Contemporary Agenda**, (Cambridge: Polity, 2013).
8. Stanley A. de Smith, **Microstates and Micronesia: Problems of America's Pacific Islands and Other Minute Territories**, (New York: New York University Press, 1970).
9. Andrew M. Dorman and Joyce P. Kaufman, **Providing for National Security, A Comparative Analysis**, (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 2014).
10. Jorri Duursma, **Fragmentation and the International Relations of Micro-states**, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
11. Lawrence Freedman, **Strategy: A History**, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
12. Colin S. Gray, **War, Peace and International Relations**, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007).
13. International Institute of Strategic Studies, **The Military Balance 2016**, (London: Routledge, 2016).
14. William R. Keylor, **A World of Nations**, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003).
15. Hugh Laracy (ed.) **Tuvalu: A History**, (Suva: University of the South Pacific Press, 1983).
16. Richard Ned Lebow, **Why Nations Fight**, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
17. Nadin, Peter, **UN Security Council Reform**, (Berlin: Taylor and Francis, 2016).
18. Victor Prescott and Clive Schofield, **The Maritime Political Boundaries of the World**, 2nd Edition, (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2005).
19. Jacques Rapaport, Ernest Muteba and Joseph J. Therattil, **Small States and Territories: Status and Problems**, (New York, Arno Press, 1971).
20. Ernie Regehr, **Disarming Conflict**, (Toronto: Zed, 2015).
21. Rupert Smith, **The Utility of Force**, (London: Allen Lane, 2005).
22. Peter N. Stearns (ed.), **Demilitarisation in the Contemporary World**, (Urbana IL: University of Illinois Press, 2013).
23. Joseph E. Stiglitz and Mary Kaldor (eds.), **The Quest for Security: Protection Without Protectionism and the Challenge of Global Governance**, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013).
24. Terry Terriff, Stuart Croft, Lucy James and Patrick M. Morgan (eds.), **Security Studies Today**, (Cambridge: Polity, 2004).
25. Joanne Wallis, **Crowded and Complex: The changing geopolitics of the South Pacific**, (Barton: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2017).
26. Paul D. Williams (ed.), **Security Studies: An Introduction**, (2nd Edition), (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013).
27. Peter H. Wilson, **Europe's Tragedy, A History of the Thirty Years War**, (London: Allen Lane, 2009).
28. Ken Booth and Tim Dunne, **Terror and the Future of Global Order**, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002).
29. Alexander Watson, **Ring of Steel: Germany and Austria Hungary at War, 1914-1918**, (London: Allen Lane, 2014).

Journals

1. Amitav Acharya, The Asia-Pacific Region: Cockpit for Superpower Rivalry, **The World Today**, Vol. 43, No. 8/9 (Aug. - Sep., 1987).
2. Alison JK Bailes and Kristmundur por Olafsson, **Developments in Icelandic Security Policy**, *Icelandic Review of Policy and Administration*, (Volume 10, No. 2, 2014).

3. Sam Batemen and Anthony Bergin, **Staying the course: Australia and maritime security in the South Pacific**, *Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Strategic Insight* (Vol.52, May 2011).
4. Anthony Bergin and Sam Bateman, **Law and Order at Sea and the contribution of the Pacific Patrol Boat Project**, *Ocean and Coastal Management* (Vol.42, 1999).
5. Andrew Hurrell, **Hegemony, Liberalism and Global Order: What Space for Would-Be Great Powers?**, in *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944)*, (Vol. 82, No. 1, Perspectives on Emerging Would-Be Great Powers Jan., 2006).
6. Apisai Ielemia, **A Threat to our Human Rights: Tuvalu's Persepective on Climate Change**, *UN Chronicle* (Vol. XLIV, No. 2, 2007).
7. Valur Ingimundarson, **Fighting the Cod Wars in the Cold War: Iceland's challenge to the Western Alliance in the 1970s**, *The RUSI Journal*, (Vol. 148:3, 2003).
8. Valur Ingimundarson, **Iceland's Security Dilemma: The End of a U.S. Military Presence.** (31.1 Fletcher F. World Affairs. 7, 24 (2007)).
9. Valur Ingimundarson, **Britain, the United States and Militarisation of Iceland 1945-1951**, *Scandinavian Journal of History* (Vol.37, Issue 2, 2012).
10. Gudni Th. Johannesson, **To the Edge of Nowhere: US-Icelandic Defense Relations during and after the Cold War**, *Naval War College Review*, (Vol. LVII, No.3/4, 2004).
11. Paddy Johnston, **The Cod Wars against Iceland: The Royal Navy as political instrument**, *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, (Vol.5:2, 1991).
12. Baldur Porhallsson, **What features determine mall states' activities in the international arena? Iceland's approach to foreign relations until the mid-1990's**, *Stjórnsmál og Stjórnarsýsla*, (Autumn 2005, Vol.1(1)).
13. Donald R. Shuster, **The Republic of Palau and its Compact, 1995–2009**, *The Journal of Pacific History*, Volume 44:3, 2009.
14. Sverrir Steinsson, **The Cod Wars: A Re-Analysis**, *European Security* (Vol. 25, Issue 2, 2016).
15. Caitlin Talmadge, **Different Threats, Different Militaries: Explaining Organizational Practices in Authoritarian Armies**, *Security Studies*, (Vol.25:1, 2016).
16. Robert A. Underwood, **The Amended US Compacts of Free Association with the Federated States of Micronesia and the Republic of Marshall Islands: Less Free, More Compact**, *East West Centre Working Papers*, (Pacific Islands Development Series, No.16, September 2003).
17. Vagts, Detlev F. "**Switzerland, International Law and World War II.**" *The American Journal of International Law* 91, no. 3 (1997).

Reports

1. Foreign and Commonwealth Office (UK), **The Overseas Territories: Security, Success and Sustainability**, (London: The Stationary Office, 2012).
2. David Hastings, **Filling Gaps in the Human Development Index: Findings for Asia and the Pacific**, (Bangkok: UNESCAP Report, February 2007).
3. **Tuvalu's Views on the Possible Security Implications of Climate Change to be included in the report of the UN Secretary General to the UN General Assembly 64th session**, http://www.un.org/esa/dsd/resources/res_pdfs/ga-64/cc-inputs/Tuvalu_CCIS.pdf
4. UNODC, **Transnational Crime in the South Pacific: A Threat Assessment 2016**, https://www.unodc.org/documents/southeastasiaandpacific/Publications/2016/2016.09.16_TOCTA_Pacific_web.pdf

On-line Resources

1. Carabiniers du Prince of Monaco, <http://en.gouv.mc/Government-Institutions/The-Government/Ministry-of-Interior/The-Palace-Guards>.
2. Changes to Diplomatic Rank <http://opil.ouplaw.com/page/vienna-and-the-codification-of-diplomatic-law>

3. Christian Science Monitor, Compact States Military Recruitment and Casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan <https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2010/0505/Uncle-Sam-wants-Micronesians-for-US-military>
4. Commonwealth, Tuvalu Status. <http://thecommonwealth.org/our-member-countries/tuvalu/history>
5. Commonwealth Protections, http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/commwlb4&div=29&start_page=751&collection=journals&set_as_cursor=70&men_tab=srchresults
6. Compacts of Free Association <http://uscompact.org/about/cofa.php>
7. Cook Islands Relationship with New Zealand <http://www.ck/govt.htm#nz>
8. Costa Rica Police Capability <http://www.coha.org/costa-rica-an-army-less-nation-in-a-problem-prone-region/>
9. **Defense of Iceland: Agreement Between the United States and the Republic of Iceland, May 5, 1951**, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/ice001.asp
10. FAO report on FSM EEZ size <http://www.fao.org/fishery/facp/FSM/en#CountrySector-GenGeoEconReport>
11. Icelandic Air Policing <https://www.shape.nato.int/icelands-peace-time-preparedness-needs>
12. Icelandic Coast Guard <http://www.lhg.is/english>
13. Iceland Defense Force <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dod/idf.htm>
14. International Crisis Response Unit <https://www.mfa.is/foreign-policy/development-cooperation/icru/>
15. International Monetary Fund, **World Economic Outlook Database**, April 2017, retrieved from <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2017/01/weodata/weorept.aspx> .
16. Law of the Sea Convention http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_historical_perspective.htm#Historical%20Perspective
17. **Liechtenstein Constitution**, retrieved from the University of Minnesota Human Rights Collection, <http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/research/liechtenstein-constitution.pdf>
18. Liechtenstein Mission to the United Nations, **Priorities at the United Nations**, (<http://www.regierung.li/priorities-at-the-united-nations-documents>) .
19. Liechtenstein Government, **Diplomatic Representations**, (<http://www.regierung.li/ministries/ministry-for-foreign-affairs/diplomatic-representations/>).
20. Pasifik Daily News, FSM discontent with Compact <http://www.guampdn.com/story/news/2015/12/03/fsm-seeks-end-compact-agreement-us/76755600/>
21. Pontifical Swiss Guard, <http://www.swissguard.va/content/guardiasvizzera/it.html>.
22. San Marino Military, <http://www.sanmarino.sm/on-line/en/home/institutions/military-and-police-corps.html>
23. Regional Security System, <http://www.rss.org.bb/about-us.html>
24. Sea Around Us Project Global EEZ data, <http://www.searoundus.org/data/#/eez>
25. Sea Around Us Project Tuvalu EEZ Data <http://www.searoundus.org/data/#/eez> .
26. Structure of the Holy Roman Empire http://www.napoleon-series.org/research/government/c_holyroman.html
27. Tuvalu Constitution, http://www.paclii.org/tv/legis/consol_act/cot277/
28. Tuvalu Engaging on UN Climate Change <http://newsroom.unfccc.int/unfccc-newsroom/tuvalu-submits-its-climate-action-plan-ahead-of-2015-paris-agreement/>
29. Tuvalu Foreign Aid in Support of Climate Change <http://dfat.gov.au/geo/tuvalu/development-assistance/Pages/objective-3-environment-and-climate-change.aspx>
30. Tuvalu Media Engagement on Climate Change <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-08-15/an-tuvalu-president-is-climate-change-27like-a-weapon-of-mass-5672696>
31. Tuvalu PM reaction to Trump <https://pasifik.news/pacific-leaders-react-us-climate-move-indignation/>

32. Tuvaluan recognition of Taiwan
<http://www.mofa.gov.tw/en/AlliesIndex.aspx?n=DF6F8F246049F8D6&sms=A76B7230ADF29736>
33. UN Charter, Article 2, <http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-i/index.html>.
34. UN Charter, Article 51, <http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-vii/index.html>.
35. UN Charter Chapter I <http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-i/>
36. UN Charter Chapter V <http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-v/index.html>
37. UN Member List <http://www.un.org/en/member-states/> - retrieved 30 June 2017
38. UN Resolution 2758 Replacing Taiwan with China
[http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/2758\(XXVI\)](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/2758(XXVI))
39. UN, Tuvalu joins, <https://www.un.int/tuvalu/activities/press-release-sqsm7530-secretary-general-welcomes-tuvalu-new-member-united-nations-family>
40. UNDP 2016 Human Development Report,
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr_2016_statistical_annex.pdf
41. UNDP, Costa Rica comparative development data
<http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/rankings.pdf>
42. US Department of the Interior FSM <https://www.doi.gov/oia/islands/fsm>
43. US Department of the Interior Palau <https://www.doi.gov/oia/islands/palau>
44. US Department of the Interior RMI <https://www.doi.gov/oia/islands/marshallislands>
45. World Bank GNI Per Capita Data,
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD?order=wbapi_data_value_2014+wbapi_data_value+wbapi_data_value-last&sort=desc
46. World Bank, World Development Indicators Database, 17 April 2017. Retrieved from
<http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/POP.pdf>