

*Table A.2: Determinants of government size*

<b>Class of models</b>	<b>Main contributions</b>
«political system effects» (strategic debt accumulation)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Alesina and Tabellini, 1990</li> <li>• Grilli et al., 1991</li> </ul>
«conflict models»	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Roubini and Sachs, 1989a,b</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Alesina and Drazen, 1991</li> <li>• Edin and Ohlson, 1991</li> </ul>
«ideological models» (antedate conflict models)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Frey and Schneider, 1978</li> <li>• Roubini and Sachs, 1989b</li> </ul>
«budgetary institutions models»	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Von Hagen, 1991, 1992</li> <li>• De Haan and Sturm, 1994</li> <li>• Poterba, 1996</li> <li>• Feld and Kirchgässner, 1999</li> </ul>
«spatial models»	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Velasco, 1999</li> </ul>