information about the facts of the case: "We have initiated investigative proceedings against
unknown perpetrators on grounds of violation of business secrets for the benefit of a foreign
country." (Dow Jones, 19.2.2008). Also: "He [the BND informant] exploited this position of
trust to obtain client data." (Bild-Zeitung, 20.2.2008, 2).
Various other quotes show the interests of the German side, especially Federal Minister of
Finance Peer Steinbrück, and the goal of the attacks via the media: "This was the deal of my
life. An investment of about 4 million euros and an expected return of 300 million euros."
(Frankfurter Rundschau, 1.3.2008, 6-7). "We have a second Liechtenstein bank in our sights."
(a public prosecutor, dpa-AFX, 24.2.2008). The entire case had apparently been well prepared
by this side: "Evidence is of unusually high quality. [...] In light of the expressiveness of the
materials, it 1s clear to most of the accused that denial 1s useless. [...] There are no indications
that the data material bought from an informant by the BND might be unlawful. [...] We
reviewed this very carefully in advance." (Attorney General in Hamm, Manfred Proyer, SZ,
27.2.2008, 1)
Delight in the success of the major investigative operations and envy among colleagues about
this success lie close together. As an officer in charge said in the magazine Capital on
28.2.2008 (p. 22), "Sometimes my colleagues want to tackle too many cases on a single day,
since it's so easy. [...] As if you go visit Grandma Schmitz and find an untaxed savings
account book." The same day, FTD (p. 11) cited the justice spokesperson of Public
Prosecutor's Office I in Munich in regard to answering the request by Liechtenstein for mutual
legal assistance from Germany: "Bochum is in charge of this case, but maybe you think we're
responsible because the BND is located here."
> Conclusion: The Bochum public prosecutor's office and subsequently other public
prosecutors' offices as well were not only proactive in terms of content,
but also in their media appearances, setting the tone of the conflict from
the outset.
As a second interest group, the financial public in Germany and Liechtenstein, but also in
Switzerland, can be identified. This includes the Liechtenstein Bankers Association (LBA),
the Association of German Banks, the Swiss Bankers Association, the Swiss Federal Banking
Commission, individual banks in Germany and Liechtenstein, and among the latter especially
Liechtenstein Global Trust (LGT), which was affected by the data theft. Depending on their
personal dismay, they express their opinions on the events from a distance, e.g. "Every
individual citizen must decide for himself what to do or not to do. We're not the police."
(Chairman of the Board of Trustees of LGT Bank, Prince Philipp von und zu Liechtenstein,
in: Die Welt, 21.2.2008, 3) or use the opportunity to draw attention to circumstances that had
been known for a long time, but were not broadly made public, e.g. "The points addressed by
Ms. Merkel are not new [i.e. implementation of the Third EU Money Laundering Directive,
conclusion of an Anti-Fraud Agreement, etc.]. This has all been underway for many years.
The situation at most accelerates the process" (LBA Director Michael Lauber, FTD:
22.2.2008, 12). The interests are clearly expressed, also across national borders: "The legal
situation is clear: there 1s banking secrecy and a tax agreement." (Speaker of the Swiss
Federal Banking Commission, Alain Bichsel, Die Welt, 21.2.2008, 3) or "Tax honesty 1s a
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