guments in Section 4.2 and Hypothesis 1 that VSC do not have their own currency. In Table A.9 we also present estimations on preference homogenei- ty (based on the relationship between the relevant VSC and adjacent countries and, especially, on current conflicts between them), our theo- retical expectation for each VSC by taking into account our judgment on preference homogeneity, the actual organizational choice or provision arrangement, some further important information on the monetary sys - tem and an overview of the correspondence between theoretical predic- tions and empirical facts. Note that preference homogeneity should play a minor role for currencies (in contrast to, say, defense issues), because VSC can easily introduce currencies from other countries which are geo- graphically far away and avoid introducing currencies of an adjacent country, if they want. Given the worldwide trend of forming monetary unions and mone- tarily integrated areas with pegged exchange rates, it is not difficult to 91 
Organizational choice: theoretical expectations versus reality AreaGNP/Ind. CountryPop.(km2)capitaLocationCapitalDate Equatorial Guinea41000028052530AfricaMalabo1968 Cap Verde38900040331010AfricaPraia1975 Kiribati82000811920PacificBairiki1979 Maldives2560002981080AsiaMale1965 Marshall Islands570001811890PacificDalap-1986 Uliga-Darrit Sahara252000252120n.a.AfricaEl Aaiun1976 Salomon Islands38900027556900PacificHoniara1978 Samoa17200028311170PacificApia1962 Sao Tomé and Principe1350001001330AfricaSao Tome1975 Suriname4320001632651000AmericaParamaribo1975 Tonga970007481790PacificNukualofa1970 Tuvalu1000026n.a.PacificVaiaku1978 Vanuatu173000121901290PacificPort Vila1980 Vatican City4550.44n.a.Europe1929 Abbreviations: Pop. = Population; Ind. = Independence; n.a. = not available. Sources: Baratta (1999), figures mainly for 1996. GNP/capita figures in $ US. 
Table 4.4: Not selected countries